Yan ALPEROVYCH
Professor of finance

Yan ALPEROVYCH 2- InVent, emlyon

 ” I like to make sure that my own work always measures up! “

Yan ALPEROVYCH
Professor of finance

 

While my main research area is private equity and venture capital (PE and VC), I have recently ventured (sorry for tautology) into M&A. In the PE/VC sandbox, two aspects are particularly interesting to me: company-level real effects of such investments and public policies promoting such investments. By real effects I mean the impact of PE/VC investments on outcomes in PE/VC-backed companies and their competitors, clients, or suppliers. By public policies I mean governmental initiatives that either provide finance to ventures directly through dedicated governmental venture capital funds, or indirectly, as limited partners committing to private VC funds. In the M&A sandbox, I study the role of rumors about public and private companies and their impact on transaction closing and pricing. Since I was trained as an empiricist, my methods are econometrics and data analysis, which fits well with the areas described above.

 

alperovych@em-lyon.com

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

Lending when relationships are scarce: The role of information spread via bank networks<br />

Lending when relationships are scarce: The role of information spread via bank networks

We investigate how information flows within bank networks facilitate syndicate formation and lending in the leveraged buyout (LBO) market, where relationships between banks and borrowers are scarce and borrower opacity is high. Using novel measures that characterize a bank’s ability to source and disseminate information within its loan syndication network, we show that the extent of this capability influences which banks join the syndicate, the share the lead bank holds, and LBO borrowing terms. Banks’ ability to source and disseminate network-based information is particularly useful when ties to prospective borrowers are lacking, with the information flows extending beyond knowledge on PE firms and LBO targets.

    M&A rumors about unlisted firms

    M&A rumors about unlisted firms

    We examine 68,044 completed or abandoned M&A transactions involving unlisted targets to determine the effect of transaction rumors on deal-closing propensity and transaction values. Estimation is challenging because rumors may be spread on purpose or emerge accidentally while transaction values are only observable for completed deals and no regulation requires to disclose them. We use indirect inference to overcome these challenges. We find that (a) M&A rumors are deal breakers, (b) rumored but closed deals have higher transaction values, and (c) the combined economic impact of (a) and (b) is negative: in expectation rumors destroy about 32% of transaction value.

    OTHER PUBLICATIONS

    Bridging the equity gap for young innovative companies: The design of effective government venture capital fund programs. Research Policy, 49 (10), 104051.

    (Alperovych, Y., Groh, A., & Quas, A. – 2020)

     How does governmental versus private venture capital backing affect a firm’s efficiency? Evidence from Belgium

    (4. Alperovych, Y., Hubner, G., & Lobet, F. – 2015)

    Private equity firm experience and buyout vendor source: What is their impact on efficiency?

    (Alperovych, Y., Amess, K., & Wright, M. – 2013)